

#### Conditions prior to Sep 44

Until Apr 44 the telephone service was quite normal and was used extensively by underground workers employing veiled language in their conversations. In April 44 the Germans withdrew the telephone service from all general subscribers and restricted its use to certain people working in the administration, in medicine, food distribution, etc., and collaborators. A modified system of the black telephone came into operation as a result of these restrictions, and continued until Sep 44. This was done in connivance with Dutch operators who still retained their positions, working under German supervision, at the telephone exchange. These operators re-connected secretly to the exchange certain extensions whose numbers were known only to the operators themselves and certain subscribers. A black telephone subscriber wishing to ring another person on the circuit would dial the operator, ask for a secret number, and the operator would connect him. In case of need, the operator could disconnect these lines at will.

It is worthy of note that the German telephone personnel supervising the Dutch in the telephone exchange were fully qualified engineers and fully acquainted with the system, which was of German origin and manufacture. In spite of this, and in view of the large number of subscribers and the complex automatic telephone network covering LEEUWARDEN and half a dozen sub-exchanges which already existed, it would have taken the Germans almost a year to check every line which had previously functioned and those which were working at the time. The services of Dutch personnel were retained right up to the liberation, and without their help and co-operation the black telephone system would have been impossible.

#### Installation of the black telephone network.

In Sep 44 power for telephone lines was made inaccessible by the Germans to everybody except the German authorities and collaborators. Therefore a complete black telephone system had to be installed.

#### Internal (LEEWARDEN)

The system installed by informant in Sep 44 was only available to half a dozen leading personalities in resistance - namely, KRAMER the chief and his staff officers. In the homes of these leading personalities the automatic telephone which had been used under normal conditions was replaced by the old-fashioned battery power crank telephone. The formerly authorized lines to the exchange still existed, and these half-dozen black lines were connected to the same terminal at the exchange, thus creating a party line (telephone ring). In this way, a conversation between two members of the ring could also be listened to by the others. Each user was assigned a special call signal such as two short rings, three short rings, or one long and one short ring, and by using the crank-operated bell he could call any other person in the ring. In case of emergency, the apparatus could be quickly disconnected and hidden.

#### External

In LEEUWARDEN, as in many other towns (UPRECHT, ZWOLLE, etc.), existed a clandestine telephone exchange

still secretly connected to the automatic system going through the official exchange. The internal black telephone ring was connected to the operator at the black exchange by one member of the ring knowing the secret (automatic) number of the black exchange. A counterpart of this system in LESUWARDEN existed in SWOLLE. Although the direct line to SWOLLE had been disconnected by the Germans, informant had arranged for a secret connection to be made at MEERKREYSEN. This was possible because the lines from LESUWARDEN to MEERKREYSEN and MEERKREYSEN to SWOLLE were still functioning. When a person at LESUWARDEN wished to ring up a person in SWOLLE he called the black operator in LESUWARDEN through the internal ring system, and the operator then called his counterpart in SWOLLE by automatic telephone, and the latter made the necessary connection in SWOLLE. Calls from SWOLLE to LESUWARDEN operated in the same manner.

#### Installation of Microphones in SD Commandant's Office.

Some days before the SD took over the building which is now NBS headquarters in LESUWARDEN, news of the arrival of the SD commandant reached informant and his colleagues in the telephone exchange. They first considered the possibility of placing explosive charges in the building and thus liquidating the new occupants. This idea they later discarded, and decided to install one microphone in the SD commandant's personal telephone and two more in adjoining rooms. He succeeded in doing this while the SD were already in the building and under the noses of the Germans working there. The telephone authorities had received orders from the Germans to make certain adjustments in the telephone system at SD headquarters, and informant himself came to carry out the work. He was thus enabled to carry out his intention while performing his legitimate duties as a representative of the telephone exchange, and while the Germans were present in the rooms he installed microphones in three telephones. Informant's task was facilitated by the fact that the cables leading from the exchange to the three telephones in question contained spare lines which were not at the time being utilized. At the exchange these spare lines were tapped and new lines laid from the exchange to a bookshop in the town which served as a listening post.

A direct line also existed, passing through the exchange from the office of the Judge Advocate of the LESUWARDEN Military Court to that of the SD commandant. This line was tapped at the exchange and another diversion made to the bookshop.


This listening post began to function on 4 Mar 45 and until the liberation all conversations passing on the lines were recorded, translated and passed in report form daily to KRAMER, the NBS chief. In this way the NBS knew in advance all details regarding impending raids, arrests, condemnations, etc., and were able to issue warnings to the people concerned, not only in LESUWARDEN but also in other regions.

Informant said he would endeavour to obtain extracts from these daily reports, and promised to forward them when available.




INTERNAL BLACK TELEPHONE SYSTEM

LEKWARDEN



MICROPHONE SET-UP

BRITWARDEN



### EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

Ninety per cent., if not more, of external communications was maintained by wireless transmission. Other methods were used but were relatively unimportant.

Innocent Letter seems to have been used very infrequently: some agents confessed to having forgotten their conventions, whilst others admitted having overlooked the possibility of using this method of communication. There was also a feeling that the strict censorship of foreign mail made this form of communication impracticable. In any case, postal facilities ceased to exist for the general public a long time before Holland was liberated. One agent, working through Holland into Germany, used Innocent Letters utilizing Playfair conventions. Postcards reached London via Switzerland and Sweden, in which countries he had been given addresses before leaving London, and they took about a month or three weeks to arrive. He never had a reply, but he learned subsequently from his Country Section that they had reached their destination. The messages were about 30 letters in length, and in order to post them in Germany it was necessary to produce all his papers at the Post Office. As his identity in Germany was "legal" the production of a sheaf of documents enabled him to post his mail. Another agent sent Innocent Letters into Sweden but never discovered if they arrived in London.

Pigeons were rarely used owing to the difficulty of housing them, and, although London often promised to despatch consignments of carrier pigeons to the Field, the promised consignments did not arrive. An agent in the ROTTERDAM area sent some messages by pigeon but he never heard if they reached England. Altogether he sent away about 20 pigeons carrying microphotographs. On one occasion he sent 10 pigeons, each carrying the same picture of the defences of the North Sea coast of Holland.

Some information was smuggled in and out of the country by courier lines working through Belgium and France into Switzerland, and after D-Day in France by infiltrating and exfiltrating agents through the battle-fronts. Information smuggled through in this way was normally in the form of microphotographs sewn into the lining of the agents' coats. The editor of the underground press in THE HAGUE had a line of communication with Switzerland which ran from Paris. Couriers carrying false German papers would travel by train to Paris and there get in touch with a former K.L.M. colleague of the editor who was able to send them on by train to within 40 km. of the Swiss frontier, which they crossed on foot. Some agents with wives and families in Belgium or France had permits to pass backwards and forwards between the two countries and were thus able to pass communications through contacts in France and Belgium to England.

Other means of external communication were never actively sought after, for it was always possible in the underground movement to link up with W/T operators almost anywhere. Even when they had no direct communication with England, the groups knew that constant radio contact was maintained and knew how to get messages passed to a W/T operator if it was required to send a message to England. When a group did want to get in touch with England, they simply wrote out the message en clair and handed it to a contact who was in touch with the W/T operator. Replies would frequently be passed back to them on the black telephone.



### WIRELESS TRANSMISSION.

Some aspects of the W/T operator's difficulties in the matter of W/T sites have already been dealt with under "PREMISES". The question of guards and D/F-ing will now be discussed.

In general, the same precautions as in use elsewhere were practiced in Holland, namely frequent changes of site, duration of sited reduced to a minimum, body-guard or team of watchers, spare sets installed for use at site, and transport of set and accessories effected when necessary by couriers.

In view of the fact that many operators were nervous of D/F-ing, a guard armed with gun or pistol would often stay in the room during the sited. There was usually some one on the watch outside the house during transmission, generally patrolling on a bicycle and with some one in the house looking out of the window for a signal in case of danger. In spite of these precautions, and in spite of being on the air only for 20 minutes or half an hour for each sited, operators were frequently D/F-ed in a very short time. It was not always possible, however, to obtain a sufficient number of people to form a team, and operators were often obliged to rely on their own personal couriers for protection. In these cases the couriers would leave the premises and wander about outside. On the arrival of anything suspicious, the courier would re-enter the premises at once with a key and would warn the operator, who usually had a hiding-place for his set. In country districts the operator would often be assisted by only one person, and he and his body-guard would frequently live together in the same house. Sets would always be transported by girl couriers, who were invaluable in this respect. If caught, they would merely say that they did not know what they were carrying.

It was an accepted principle of underground life that reports should be circulated immediately on any suspicious activity on the part of the Germans, such as a concentration of vehicles or anything which might possibly have some connection with D/F-ing. By means of this intelligence service operators were warned immediately there was any danger.

Every D/F-ing activity varied from place to place. In the early days of the occupation, and even up to the end of 1943, it was comparatively rare, but in 1944 it grew in intensity and reached its peak in early 1945. Activity in THE HAGUE and AMSTERDAM in 1944 and 1945 was intense, whereas in ROTTERDAM, even in 1945, only six to eight cars were operating. In the country districts, notably in the OVERIJSSSEL, there was little, if any, activity. In the autumn of 1944 there were only about 12 D/F cars in North and South Holland and the UTRECHT area, but this area was very efficiently covered by them.

The cars were often Wehrmacht cars or civilian armoured vehicles camouflaged as ambulances or laundry-vans. The cars' number-plates were changed almost daily. The cars were always petrol-driven and worked in two's and three's, frequently drawing a characteristic trailer behind them. Inevitably, both cars and drivers became known to the underground intelligence service who reported changes in number-plates or other details to the appropriate quarter immediately. In this way their presence in any locality was immediately notified, and they were not much feared, provided the operator worked with a body-guard and had a place where he could quickly hide his set and material.

Another form of D/F activity was the portable apparatus carried about by Luftwaffe personnel, who could be seen wandering in the streets with earphones and suspicious-looking suitcases.

In general, there was no serious D/F-ing before December 1944, but when the Germans first began on a big scale they caught quite a lot of operators sapping.

The following extract on D/F-ing is of interest:

"The agent had considerable difficulty in achieving a state of security from the point of view of safe houses, as these were difficult to obtain. He was transmitting from the same place for days at a time without changing the address and at one time was transmitting for 4 months (September to December, 1944) from the Belgian Legation. However, as far as possible he did move about, although this was always very much limited by the lack of accommodation. Partly as a result of this and partly because he found home station tended to prolong the saps unduly he was D/F-ed on three occasions that he knows of. The first time (in September, 1944) was while he was working in the Belgian Legation and a D/F car was observed in the vicinity by some one looking from the window. He stopped transmitting and that was the end of that. On the second occasion (in December, 1944) he was still in the Belgian Legation and a D/F car stopped at the end of the street. A Dutch policeman was going into each house along the street and he decided that to stop would have betrayed to the listener in the car the fact that the man was entering the house where the set was, so he continued to transmit and as he was in a completely concealed place he was not found. About half an hour later, when he had finished his saps and gone, five Germans in civilian clothes came and searched the house and spent about an hour doing so, including a visit to the roof where they found several pre-war serials, but not the agent's own, which was concealed in the same place as the set.

"About a fortnight later, the agent was sending from another house in a street of 5 houses. He had been using the same signal plan for nearly five months, but this was the first time he had used the house. About ten minutes after he came on the air the immediate vicinity was surrounded by 5 D/F cars and 75 Gränpolizei. They began to search the 5 houses from the other end of the street and they went about it very thoroughly indeed, practically pulling the first four houses to pieces. The agent had only time to hide his set under some coal. The search began at about ten past 11 in the morning, and at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon the agent took his hat and coat and went out. One of the policemen asked him where he was going, and he said he was going to work and was allowed to continue. Although they searched the ground floor of the house where the agent was, for some reason they did not go upstairs and so the set was not found and the next day the organisation was able to move it elsewhere. The agent stopped transmitting on the signal plan because he knew that a new one was on the way and he was able to start the new plan about five days later. He was never again D/F-ed as far as he knows.

"At one time the agent tried to use guards outside the house from which he was transmitting, but he found that these people were constantly interrupting his saps with false alarms about slow-moving cars and as he abandoned this method and merely used a guard in the house, looking out of the window."



### Coding.

In general, organizers did the coding themselves, using their own conventions, or they entrusted this work to reliable girl couriers. The operator used his conventions only for personal messages. Messages, therefore, arrived and left the V/T operator in cipher and he was thus ignorant of their contents. C.T.P. cipher was used and was quite satisfactory. Some agents burnt all copies of messages immediately after despatch or receipt and had no difficulty in referring back to previous messages as they had memorized the contents. Others kept copies long enough for a repetition to be provided if required. Copies were kept from five to fourteen days and then destroyed, but in most cases some precautions were taken against a sudden search, and if possible a fire would be available to burn both message and code. One agent always had an incendiary bomb handy when decoding or encoding. In a few cases, where a really secure hiding place could be found, all copies of messages were kept.

### Inter-Communication.

Organizers kept in touch with their operators by means of a courier service, by legal or illegal telephone, or by each visiting a contact address known to both. A courier would bring the organizer's already-enciphered messages to a contact address and the operator's personal courier or body-guard would collect them and leave at the address any incoming messages, also in cipher. Some organizers lived in the same house or flat as their operators, or, when this was not so, visited their operators quite openly.

### General.

In most parts of Holland, there was no electricity in flats or private houses after September 1944, and even before that current was not always available. Batteries were, therefore, used and some difficulty was experienced in getting them re-charged. Establishments still using electricity, such as hospitals, breweries, bakeries etc., were contacted, and with their help batteries were re-charged. Girl couriers carried the sets and batteries from place to place - but always suitably camouflaged, as the operational suitcase was well-known to the Germans. Later, pedal generators were dropped, but in many cases they arrived too late to be of assistance.

The following is an extract from a report received from an organizer in AMSTERDAM:

"There was no current in AMSTERDAM after October except in hospitals and certain big buildings. The batteries were charged with steam generators, bicycle generators or from hospitals. It was dangerous, though, to tap electricity mains as this could be detected. However, they had special contacts with the electricity company. They applied for generators from England in October and did not get them until March. Three generators were sent but they were too heavy and were smashed on landing. The most suitable accumulator sent out was a British accumulator that had stamped on it 'Not to be dropped', and this always arrived in the best condition. They had to buy one-tenth of their accumulators before these began to arrive from England. It was very difficult to buy them on the spot. Some were stolen from the Germans and some from telephone offices. Operators often pointed out that the technical side of their work was far



more difficult than the security side. Certain operators stated that stads fixed for transmission after 5 or 6 o'clock in the evening were inconvenient, especially in winter, owing to the difficult conditions under which they worked. It was suggested that the best time for stads would have been between 3 a.m. and 4 p.m.\*

#### T.D. System.

In the autumn of 1944, when the Germans began to intensify their D/F-ing activity, certain operators asked England for suggestions and were told to go out into the country. This, in the opinion of the operators, was one of the worst things to do, as a D/F-ing car would find the area where they were operating and then the police would throw a cordon round and there would be no chance for the operator as there would be so few houses in the area to be searched. On the other hand, in the town the D/F-ing cars would only track the operator down to a block of flats and it would take the police so long to search everyone that the operator would have plenty of time to conceal his set.

As an answer to D/F-ing, the T.D. system was introduced. They built up their own telephone exchange to which each T/T set was connected. This enabled an operator to sit in a room and tap out a message which would actually go out on a set situated some distance away. The set was tuned by somebody on the spot. These secret lines were connected partly by P.T.T. experts and partly by the electricity company, neither knowing exactly what the other was doing. Where there were existing telephone lines these were used, but diverted so as not to go through the central exchanges. Sometimes new cables had to be laid and, as most of the lines had been disconnected, some had to be reconnected. This special secret telephone exchange was used in the AMSTERDAM area instead of the ordinary underground exchange, as they expected the latter might be blown and they did not want to be without communications. With the T.D. system it was possible for each set in a different part of the city to work in rotation for, say, five minutes. This completely foxed the German D/F-ing cars.

A full report on the T.D. system is attached.

### T.O. IN HOLLAND

In Holland it was found that in many cases it was not possible for a W/T operator to work in the country. The country is so densely populated that it is almost impossible for an operator to work or live in the country without getting known. People began to talk - probably with no wrong intention - but in the end it would reach the ears of an informer. Travelling was also very difficult, and couriers making regular journeys to and from the operator and his chief found it harder and harder to find suitable cover for these journeys. For these reasons many operators were forced to work in towns. Here an operator was able to work quite successfully until the end of 1944, when the Germans improved their methods of D/F-ing to such an extent that it was considered unsafe to be on the air for more than 10 minutes. At the same time the traffic increased daily and, although there was a sufficient number of houses from which an operator could transmit, it was found impossible to pass all the traffic during the short time an operator could be on the air, even if he worked two or three times a day. The danger from D/F-ing was overcome by having an efficient protection service which was able to give danger signals to the operator well in time to prevent the risk of arrest, but 10 minutes per sked was too short a time, and the traffic to be sent began piling up more and more.

To meet this difficulty the following system, called the Transmission Dispersal System, was used:

Several transmitters were ready to go on the air at the same time from different places with the keys substituted by relays which were worked from one central point. These transmitters were tuned by people specially trained in this work who were in constant telephonic communication with the W/T operator at the central point during each sked. The T.O. operators would be at their posts half an hour before sked time and would then ring up the W/T operator for their instructions. The W/T operator would work out his sked beforehand, deciding on which frequencies, for how long and from which T.O. points he would transmit. Each T.O. operator was supplied with a number of crystals and, according to the instructions he received from the W/T operator, would tune up his set. Five T.O. stations were prepared, and these would be tuned as follows:

|                    |                 |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| Stations A. and B. | to Frequency 1. |
| " C. and D.        | " " 2.          |
| Station E.         | " " 3.          |

Station A. was as far as possible from Station B. and Station C. was as far as possible from Station D. At sked time the W/T operator from the central point would begin his transmission, using Frequency 1. from Station A. After about 5 minutes he would switch over to Station B., using the same frequency. A few minutes later he would switch over to Station C., using Frequency 2., followed by Station D., also on Frequency 2. In the meantime, Stations A. and B. would return their sets to Frequency 1. The W/T operator at the central point, after having worked for 10 to 15 minutes on Frequency 2. - one half of the time from Station C. and the other half from Station D. - would switch back to Station A. and continue transmitting on Frequency 1. Station E., tuned to Frequency 3., would be kept in reserve. In this way the traffic was being sent without interruption but from a different part of the town every five minutes, with a change of frequency every 10 minutes. Thus a sked of, say, 40 minutes could be worked with very little danger from D/F-ing.



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$$\vec{v} = \frac{1}{2} \vec{v}_1 + \frac{1}{2} \vec{v}_2$$

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There were no secret meetings, no secret headquarters, no secret communications. The organization was a loose network of individuals who met in public places, such as bars, restaurants, and clubs. They used the same names and addresses as they used in their daily lives. The only way to identify them was through their actions and the people they associated with. The organization was not a formal group with a hierarchy. It was a collection of individuals who shared a common goal and a common enemy. They were not trained soldiers or spies. They were ordinary people who had been recruited into the organization through a process of gradual exposure and persuasion. The organization was not a threat to the security of the United States. It was a collection of individuals who were loyal to their country and their fellow citizens. They were not a threat to the lives of the people of the United States. They were a threat to the lives of the people of the United States who were loyal to the United States and its principles.

There came into existence, there re, a lot of "good" and "bad" people. The "good" people were the ones who were recruited into the organization. They were the ones who were loyal to the organization and its goals. They were the ones who were willing to do whatever it took to achieve their goals. They were the ones who were willing to sacrifice their lives for the organization. The "bad" people were the ones who were not recruited into the organization. They were the ones who were not loyal to the organization and its goals. They were the ones who were not willing to do whatever it took to achieve their goals. They were the ones who were not willing to sacrifice their lives for the organization. The organization was not a threat to the security of the United States. It was a collection of individuals who were loyal to their country and their fellow citizens. They were not a threat to the lives of the people of the United States. They were a threat to the lives of the people of the United States who were loyal to the United States and its principles.

Agents usually had a hide out somewhere where they could retire in comparative safety, and where whereabouts were known only to a few people. Visits to agents' homes were discouraged, and hiding places and means of quick get away in case of trouble were always considered when premises were chosen. An attempt was made to keep the groups as small as possible, and recruits had to be vouched for before being accepted. Some groups had a small security section, numbering about a dozen men, who made it their job to keep watch over enemy activities, and who were responsible for the security of the organization. These men acquired intelligence which would be useful in the self-preservation of resistance members. For this purpose a number of them were installed in various police, SD and Gestapo offices, and in this way, the Underground was always warned in advance of impending raids, controls, arrests etc.



at ... where members ... casualties of any ... form of enemy activity, ... the latter ... ahead of the ...

... definite rule which was observed by ... the person taken ... at least ... time to make their ... arrangements for the ...

Enemy S.E.

#### Controls.

Snap controls carried out by one or the other of the ... J.G. ... mentioned, often ... at the ... or Land ... frequently ... in the cities ... if the control was effected by ... Police alone, irregularities were often overlooked, ... were ... that was not likely. There was no point in trying to avoid the controls as they were to be found everywhere, on bridges, main streets, road crossings, stations and on trains. One had no idea where they were likely to take place. The towns were controlled by policemen on foot and in cars, but less so than in the centre of the town than in the outskirts. The personnel employed sometimes worked in civilian clothes but would be a well known soldier or SD men ... with them. The controls operated mainly for obtaining forced labour for Germany ... papers, even if in order, were often ... and ... at ... the individual who effected the control.

Body searches were not thorough, was one and ... being subjects which most interested the Germans. Certain people would be picked out for a thorough search and completely stripped. Anybody carrying arms was liable to be hit immediately.

Controls in the trains were frequent. Sometimes they would pick out one person in each compartment and go over his papers very thoroughly, but sometimes they would just pass along the carriages, glancing at the papers of every one in each compartment, and take no further action.

Controls differed widely, some being dangerously efficient, others being merely routine verifications of papers, which were often only subjected to cursory examination. Some agents spent months in the field without ever being controlled at all, and during the towns ... controls were even entered except at ... into an main road or near Wehrmacht camps or barracks.

The following incidents illustrate different types of controls encountered:-





[illegible]

En Jerechts

[illegible]

17. 11th & 5th Street Station

[illegible][illegible]

34751114000

Plain-clothes men of the 37th, Lieutenant, Sgt or even District Police were used in this case, but were at first not so trained and did not particularly like to live. Few agents reported cases of being followed, although certainly a residue were made as a result of their work in Japan and Italy. One agent reported that he was once followed by a plain-clothes man in the street, and when he knew that he was followed he would give a very conversational conversation and would not let the man follow. The agent does not think more than two or three were ever employed to follow him and he was always able to look

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

methods of penetration of Underground organization were many and varied. Information was obtained which has already been discussed. Another way of getting into a group of a subversive group was to employ Dutchmen who, through their recruiting on the part of the underground movement, became members of a group and subsequently betrayed it to agents of the police. Fortunately although the lower levels were often infiltrated by this method, security was sufficiently good to prevent the penetration going any higher.





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INTERVIEW

1. Name of informant

2. Date of interview

3. Place of interview

4. Details of interview

5. Summary of findings

6. Conclusions

[illegible]

In the "acoustic" list information there are several  
the names - ... .., ... .., ... .. ("..."), I ...  
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... .., etc., etc.  
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... .., ... .., ... .., ... ..  
... .., ... .., ... .., ... ..

During Mr. J's interrogation source had been asked leading questions about details but source denied having been there any place to his story even though source was being constantly told of the production of the film from detailed descriptions of scene + the accused there.

Def asked him to give a complete list of all the people he had attended, all the subjects taught, the names of the instructors and the use of his fall weapons. In view of their obviously extensive knowledge of the "set-up" informant admitted having attended some of the schools and having taught such subjects as weapon-training but left at each time as an experience in the use of secret links, codes, ciphers etc. He was also asked who or to whom he had been a "silent-killing" but did not know whom that he was a "peace loving" man he had not shown any interest in this and did not receive instruction. He asked to the name of fellow students at S.T.S.S., since he said that he had been trained with an assortment of intelligence and did not know for foreign names. These questions were all referred to him after lapse of 24 hours. Informant was not quite sure if he always related himself correctly, but thinks he must have as he has seldom answered to further reiteration of the above questions. MAY wrote down his answers without comment.

When Bird asked to give the names of the instructors, Burns gave completely fictitious names and volunteered the information that no list of instructor names could really be kept up-to-date as they were changed so frequently.

He was also questioned about THREE of which he was shown a very accurate outline. Regarding that they were really very ignorant about the propaganda show, I was given a full and lively description of a completely fictitious place, existing only in his imagination. All this was carefully annotated. I also questioned him on local conditions in England; rationing restrictions, newspapers, propaganda, etc. etc.



He was then given pen and paper and told to write out all briefing instructions given him before his departure from the U.K. After putting it off for a long time he produced half a sheet of phoney briefing. No comment was made but a number of fresh sheets of paper, each bearing the same heading as his original briefing dossier were put in front of him and he was told that with this further aid to his memory he might be able to tell them a little more. He still managed, however, not to give too much away, explaining that his briefing had been very short and not at all comprehensive and that further instructions should have been sent him from time to time but he had been arrested before receipt of them.

SCHUMMACHER then took over the interrogation. He was a very talkative man and source found it comparatively easy to distract his attention from the matter in hand, consequently time passed and SCHUMMACHER did not obtain much more information. This went on for about 6 weeks. SCHUMMACHER evinced great interest in the works of the German philosophers and the interrogation of source usually turned into a discussion on philosophy. The authorities, however, suddenly awakened to the fact that SCHUMMACHER was not producing the "goods" and source thinks that he must have been severely reprimanded because he suddenly got down to real business once more. Source was asked in great detail what he knew about resistance groups and secret organizations. Source denied all knowledge of such activities. The entire interrogation was carried on in German and informant was quite well-treated although he was extremely conscious of the fact that it was his interrogator's intention to wear him down with non-stop questioning. Source learnt later that much more brutal methods were used on other suspects during interrogation. Interrogation was completed by the end of March.

Source continued to be held at this prison after his interrogation was over until the end of July. During this time he was shown various photographs, and asked if he could identify any of them. Source did recognize one of the photographs as that of a fellow student called KOOPS, but he did not admit recognition. He was never confronted by the actual subjects of these photographs.

During his entire stay here, informant was kept in solitary confinement. The cells on either side of and below informant's were either kept empty or were used by S.S. guards or other German personnel. Source was taken out by his guards for exercise. He was not allowed to leave his cell without first donning a mask which he was not allowed to remove until he returned to his cell.

On only one occasion were the precautions re isolation of cells relaxed, when on 5th June source was moved into another cell. He had been aware during the day of an atmosphere of barely controlled excitement throughout the prison but could not guess the reason for this, having been out of contact with the outside world for so long.

During his first night in his new cell, source overheard voices in conversation below him. Lying on the ground he was able to determine that there were at least three people in the lower cell and they were talking in Dutch. Next day he thought he heard tapping and after a bit replied by tapping out Morse on the heating pipes.

The men below were apparently Dutch refractores. They "served" up to source the day's great news, namely that the long-awaited Allied invasion had begun. This was the first news of the outside world source had had since his arrest, other than from German-controlled Dutch newspapers.

Source had managed to get on fairly friendly terms with one of the G.I. guards and this man kept him supplied with newspapers even after the invasion and he was, therefore, able to keep fairly up-to-date with current happenings.

In his new cell, source had been quick to note that the cardboard put over the fan-light above the door for black-out purposes, was unprotected by glass or a metal grid as was usual. He managed to cut a small hole in this cardboard and by standing on a chair could watch what went on in the corridor outside his cell. In this way he managed to observe and identify several of the prisoners from neighbouring cells. Amongst these he recognised 2 fellow students HARRY SMYTH (real name) and BOB SMITH (student's name). He could not, however, speak to either.

About 24th July informant was moved to VUGHT, where he was kept for 3 weeks until the end of August. During the journey he recognised one of his fellow prisoners as GRIFF (the man living at V.O.'s home) and managed to exchange a few words with him. From GRIFF he heard that V. V. had turned out to be a double agent working for the Germans and that the whole set up of the organisation was, therefore, known to the enemy for some time. During his stay at VUGHT he managed to contact other fellow prisoners, one of whom was SMITH, whom he had seen at his last prison. SMITH told him that he had been arrested six weeks after his arrival in April 1944, together with 3 or 4 others. Source also met 2 girls; the husband of one of these girls was an agent, who had been trained in England from November 1943 and had been dropped along with SMITH and a Dutchman from South Africa - JOHN ROBERTS by name - in April or May 1944. Both of these men had been arrested shortly after their arrival.

About the end of August source was given a red document called a "Schuttschiffbefehl", which he was ordered to sign. This paper decreed that source was to be committed for trial as having participated in an illegal organisation. Source stated that a white Schuttschiffbefehl was also in existence. The "white" variety stated that the authorities were satisfied and that no further interrogations or trials were deemed necessary; the holder would merely be retained as a prisoner from the date of signature.

In a few days' time informant was moved for trial to UTRECHT. Owing to the extremely rapid advance of the Allies, however, he was not given a trial at UTRECHT but was whisked away within less than a week to AMSTEL together with 80 others, some of whom had already been tried.

Here he remained for a week during which time he learnt that the dossiers relating to the cases of all members of this party of 80 had been mislaid - this was probably due to the state of chaos already resulting from the Allies' lightning advance.



About 10th September, the whole party was moved to LUTTRINGHAUSEN, where thanks to the continued absence of any records whatsoever, they were able to pass themselves off as civilian internees. Source remained here until 11th November, during which time he met a Lt. DE JONGH, a Lt. BOSSE BUYSMAN and a Lt. TOWNST, all of whom belonged to Major SOMERS' office. All three had been tried and condemned to death.

4/ When source was moved to HAMLIN on 12th November 1942 other members of the original party of 80 were also transferred. This move, in source's opinion, was occasioned by the rebellious attitude which he and the others had adopted towards the authorities. The move was, therefore, by way of being a punitive measure. The 3 Dutch officers above-mentioned were included in the transferred party, TOWNST and BOSSE BUYSMAN managed to escape en route by jumping from one of the last coaches of the train when half-way through a tunnel.

At HAMLIN the "civilian internee" story did not go down, although their papers had not yet been brought to light. Several members of the party were subjected to interrogation and the Governor of the prison was able to establish that 29 members of the party had already been tried and had been condemned to death and the others were awaiting trial for major offences. Eleven members of the latter category, including informant, were sent to HANOVER on 26th January, 1943.

They were interrogated here by the Gestapo until 11th February, all of the 11 being accused of having worked for the O.D.



#### NOTE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF ABTEILUNG IIIF, THE HAGUE, AGAINST S.O.E.

This note on the activities of Abteilung IIIF, The Hague, is not intended to constitute a full report, which could only be prepared against all the available S.O.E. records on the activities in Holland, and, more important still, against the whole of W/T traffic which has passed between this country and Holland. The note is slender and gives no more than an indication of the methods employed and the problems with which both sides were faced; it does, however, illustrate certain points which may be useful in conducting other activities from this end and some lessons can be learned from its reversal. During the period under review a battle was being fought between S.O.E., who were engaged in setting up a secret army in Holland, and Abteilung IIIF of the Hague, who were engaged in frustrating that enterprise. The German objective was, not only to defeat the particular enterprise in which the British had embarked but also to penetrate, control and preserve the organization which was being set up in order to ensure that Allied activities would not be diverted into other less well known channels; in this endeavour Abteilung IIIF had a very considerable measure of success.

#### The S.O.E. Project.

In June of 1942 a certain JOHANNES and a W/T operator to whom he was attached arrived in Holland. JOHANNES had been sent to contact the O.D., an indigenous loyalist organization. He was to tell its leaders that he had come from a joint Dutch/British mission and was to disclose to them the "Plan for Holland" which had been worked out. He was to obtain their comments upon this plan and to emphasize that the Dutch Government in London had approved it in principle and expected it to be accepted in substance. After introducing himself to the leaders of the O.D., JOHANNES was to make contact with its various sub-groups operating throughout the country. JOHANNES was to report to London and London was to send out trained organizer instructors to the groups as and when JOHANNES reported they were ready to receive them. The members of the secret army were thus to be recruited from the O.D.; but once so recruited they were to be debarred from their previous activities and were thereafter to regard themselves as part of a separate organization controlled from London. For the purpose of carrying out this mission JOHANNES had to organize reception committees for the weapons and supplies and additional personnel which were to be sent. Such was the ambitious plan and during the next 18 months the whole of S.O.E. activities in Holland were directed towards making it a success. Its failure at the end of that period would mean the failure of by far the greater proportion of Allied activities against Holland directed from London.

As events have shown the plan had in it a flaw which proved fatal. If JOHANNES or the man sent to relieve him were to be captured and turned round the plan would not merely be defeated but might be successfully used by the Germans for the penetration of the O.D. itself. The way was opened for a German agent of Abteilung IIIF, not merely to pose as an Allied agent, but to do so with all the authority and character of an S.O.E. agent in direct touch with, and under orders from, London.

#### The Organisation of Abwehr IIIF.

Abwehr IIIF was the organization whose business it was to counter such Allied activities in Holland. Two of the principal officers responsible for penetration work were Hauptmann Ernst REISEWETTER & BADEN and Oberstleutnant GIBTES & GERHARD. REISEWETTER had been in the Balkans and joined the Abwehr in Holland in about April 1942.